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Alexander  
Throughout the world when people talk about conciliation 
and mediation in a global context there is a tension between 
diversity and consistency. On one hand, there is the desire to 
experiment, develop mediation as a flexible process with a 
diversity of styles; on the other hand there is the aim to ensure 
consistent quality by regulating mediation.  How has UNCITRAL 
approached this tension? 
 
Sekolec 
UNCITRAL treaded lightly on this issue.  The general 
philosophy of UNCITRAL is to avoid over-regulation and rigid 
procedural recommendations. We are dealing with international 
mediation. It is referred to by various terms, including 
conciliation, but there is no difference in the essential concept, at 
least from the legislative point of view. The Intergovernmental 
Working Group that prepared the Model Law on Conciliation 
(MLC) was conscious that the Model Law would need to be 
grafted on an existing legal system in any given country. There 
will, in fact, be a number of legislative rules in existing legal 
systems that will complement the body of the Model Law. So we 
were aware that we did not have to regulate everything. We just 
regulated the primary pillars of mediation. The reasons for this 
were, firstly, that the Model Law is part of a larger picture of 
international dispute resolution and, secondly, we believed that at 
this stage in the development of mediation procedural regulation 
would not be beneficial.  I believe that the development of quality 
in mediation should come from education and promotion rather 
than through procedural safeguards.  
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Alexander 
You are suggesting that at ‘this stage of the development of 
mediation’ too much regulation is inappropriate. At what stage do 
you think we find ourselves now? 
 
Sekolec 
One cannot give a uniform answer that covers all countries. 
I think we are at the stage where mediation is very fashionable. 
This may result in people tending to expect too much from it. But 
there are core aspects of this fashion, which I think are very useful 
and here to stay. We do not want to create controversy or stifle 
development by hasty regulation. 
 
Alexander 
So you are really trying to encourage experimentation 
within a particular framework? 
 
Sekolec 
Yes. For example, consider where the initiatives for 
mediation come from:  the courts, arbitrators and even the parties 
themselves? Who acts as the mediator? Will it be the senior 
personalities in the trade concerned, village chiefs, the community 
mediation centers, the big law firms or arbitration centers? All 
these aspects of international ADR need to develop. If one 
regulates the process too early then one restricts the options 
available – and one may be left with commercial mediations 
between sophisticated parties only. The huge spectrum of 
mediation needs to be left alone to enable it to expand and thrive.  
 
Alexander 
You mention mediation by village chiefs and arbitration 
centers. One current theme in the literature focuses on the 
difference between western mediation and some of the traditional 
forms of mediation-like processes in first nation cultures such as 
indigenous Australians and Americans where, for example, 
notions of neutrality and confidentiality have very different 
meanings, if they exist at all.  
 
Sekolec 
Yes, the world of dispute resolution comprises much more 
than western notions of mediation. The Model Law is drafted in 
such a way as to accommodate as many cultural concepts of 
mediation as possible which have the ability to operate within the 
legal system of a given country. 
 
Alexander  
In the MLC are processes such as neutral evaluation or 
mini-trial also included in the definition of conciliation? 
 
Sekolec 
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Yes they are. Article 1 defines conciliation. It provides that 
conciliation is a process where two parties in a dispute engage a 
third person to help them settle it. Article 1 also provides that 
conciliation can also be referred to by names such as mediation 
and other terms with a similar meaning. Therefore mini-trial and 
neutral evaluation are also covered by article 1.  
The Working Group was conscious of the fact that in 
practice there may be some real differences between conciliation, 
mediation and mini-trial in terms of techniques and approaches. 
For example, there may be variations regarding the role of the 
mediator, whether the mediator has a more active or passive role, 
whether the mediator proposes solutions to a settlement and 
variations in the type of persons representing the parties (for 
example, a mini-trial typically involves the most senior 
management unlike other forms of ADR). From a legislative point 
of view, however, these differences do not matter because the 
legislative rule must be flexible enough to incorporate all non-
determinative ADR processes.  
Another point is that in practice one will find elements of 
mediation, conciliation, neutral evaluation and even mini-trial in 
one single case. Pure cases where the mediator does not offer his 
or her opinion in a direct or indirect manner are rare in 
international commercial dispute resolution.    
So the short answer to your question is yes.  All these 
processes fit into the broad definition of conciliation whereby 
parties engage a third person to assist them in resolving their 
differences.  
 
Alexander 
So in essence it comes back to the tension between 
flexibility and regulation.  If the Working Group had been clearer 
about definitions, it would have lost some of the flexibility of 
conciliation.  
 
Sekolec 
Yes. Flexibility is one of the core features of mediation and 
a feature which makes it a very attractive process for disputants 
because they can adjust the precise nature of the process to suit 
their needs. 
 
Alexander 
You earlier spoke about the need for quality processes and 
that in your view quality comes from education.  If we link that 
idea to the different sorts of processes that might arise under the 
definition of conciliation – mini-trial, neutral evaluation, 
conciliation and mediation – it seems that a need emerges to 
educate clients and lawyers about the distinctions between these 
processes. Clients need to be in a position to give informed 
consent to the process in which they participate. 
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Sekolec 
My reaction to your question is that the environment itself 
would define the need for process differentiation.  In a particular 
country, a party may well be familiar with the kind of processes 
that would work well for it in that jurisdiction and would select 
from that range. In commercial disputes one would require a 
particular type of process and in village disputes between 
neighbors a very different one.  The issues related to quality are 
diverse across cultures and environments.   
Continuing education should be a requirement so that one 
does not attend a one week course and become a mediator for life. 
A mediator needs to develop and always learn new things and 
evaluate their own experience. Only in this way will mediators be 
able to keep abreast of current techniques and continually improve 
their skills.   
 
Alexander  
The Model Law provides a broad definition of conciliation 
which includes interest-based facilitative processes, on one hand, 
and directive, more evaluative processes, on the other.  Do you 
think there is a danger in the international commercial field that 
mediation practice will become more directive and evaluative 
because many lawyers and arbitrators trained in directive and 
determinative processes are moving into international commercial 
conciliation roles? 
 
Sekolec 
I think this danger exists. However, the danger does not 
come from the Model Law or from the legislator of the enacting 
state. Rather, it comes from the procedural rules that the lawyers 
draft in contracts. If the lawyers shoot themselves in the foot by 
making the process more complex and expensive, then one cannot 
protect them from it. In some cases a highly structured mediation 
is not appropriate, while in other cases it is. If the parties and their 
representatives organize the ADR process poorly, then they have 
to live with the consequences. They will learn from these lessons 
and do it differently next time. 
 
Alexander 
So in other words, there is a responsibility on the parties 
themselves and also on the ADR service-providers to take 
responsibility for the management of the dispute.   
In your opinion what is likely to happen in sophisticated 
international business to business (B2B) transactions in terms of 
the use of this law? Do you think that international business will 
embrace mediation or will they rather take a tiered approach and 
engage in conciliation followed by arbitration or some other ADR 
process?  
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Sekolec 
We are seeing again and again that the best thing to do is to 
leave the practice to the parties. The parties can adopt iron-clad, 
structured sets of procedural obligations if they so choose. One 
sees this in some construction contracts and it suits the industry. 
No doubt in five years they will have invented new process 
solutions. 
Then there are hybrids or blended processes that contain 
elements of arbitration and mediation within the one procedure. 
For example, in some forms of neutral evaluation, the ADR 
provider proposes a settlement to the parties. If they do not object 
to it within 30 days, the settlement becomes binding and 
enforceable as a judgment. So there are elements of advisory and 
determinative processes. 
 
Alexander 
Would this situation fall within the Model Law – after all 
there is a potentially binding outcome proposed by the ADR 
provider?  
 
Sekolec 
That is an interesting question. The Model Law specifically 
states that the conciliator has no power to impose a binding 
decision on the parties.  It is really a matter of interpretation. Has 
the third party imposed a decision indirectly and by default; or has 
s/he made a suggestion that the parties have, after 30 days 
reflection, chosen to adopt in a binding and enforceable form? My 
own sense is that, as such a process aims at formulating a 
recommendation to which the parties are invited to agree. The 
process will be conducted as a conciliation. After all, the parties 
are free to reject the proposal within 30 days of it being made. 
Therefore it should fall within the Model Law. 
 
Alexander 
Earlier you mentioned the pillars of the Model Law. What 
are the main pillars of the MLC? 
 
Sekolec 
The pillars of the Model Law are confidentiality, party 
autonomy and fair treatment. The single most important pillar, 
which I think requires legislative action, is the issue of 
confidentiality or the evidentiary privilege of admissions, 
proposals and views expressed during the mediation process.   
The first aspect of confidentiality relates to the 
admissibility of evidence in subsequent proceedings. In order to 
succeed, parties in a mediation must be able show their cards and 
have open and frank discussions. The parties do not want to make 
admissions if these admissions are likely to come back to haunt 
them. This may occur if in the event of an unsuccessful mediation, 
the case then goes to arbitration or other determinative 
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proceedings. If for example, during the mediation one party admits 
that its engineer made a technical error with the expectation of a 
similar admission from the other party, it is crucial that a 
legislative guarantee exists to the effect that such a statement is 
inadmissible as evidence in court or other subsequent proceedings. 
Even where the parties commit themselves contractually 
not to offer what is said during a mediation as evidence in 
subsequent proceedings, there are many legal systems in which 
such an agreement may not to be binding on the court or an 
arbitral tribunal. This would be the case in a number of Central 
European States. In these and other jurisdictions, a judge may 
insist on hearing the evidence where it is considered crucial to the 
case.   Accordingly, rules of conciliation procedure agreed upon by 
the parties, such as the UNICITRAL conciliation rules and other 
institutional rules of conciliation institutions, cannot guarantee the 
inadmissibility of admissions, proposals and statements made 
during the mediation as evidence in subsequent proceedings. This 
is the reason why a legislative regulation on mediation is 
necessary. 
The second aspect of confidentiality is the prohibition of 
the mediator from acting as an arbitrator or advisor in subsequent 
proceedings. It is good to enshrine this point in legislation and 
make the prohibition clear so as to give the parties security on this 
matter.  
A further aspect of confidentiality arises in the context of 
information received by the mediator from one party on the 
condition that it is kept confidential. In the circumstances, the 
conciliator has a duty to keep the information confidential. 
The final aspect of confidentiality is that the parties are 
bound by a general duty of confidentiality not to disclose to 
anyone what happened during the mediation.  They are not at 
liberty to publish or, for example, have a press conference about 
what happened during the mediation.  
The statutory duty of confidentiality is a useful disciplinary 
measure. But it would not be recommended to have a law of 
mediation about confidentiality alone. That is why the Working 
Group began with a definition of mediation (conciliation) which is 
the subject of the regulation. Then we considered it useful to offer 
something like a starter kit for mediation proceedings. So, for 
example, the Model Law regulates the appointment of mediators 
and expresses a few general and universally acceptable procedural 
principles. While it was not essential to do so, it is valuable to 
include some general procedural regulation in the form of default 
provisions to give more context to the Model Law. Parties can 
always regulate these aspects differently by contract. This allows 
mediation to maintain its flexibility. 
 
Alexander 
What would you say to people who criticize the 
confidentiality provisions as having so many exceptions as to 
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render the concept of mediation facilitating a full and frank 
discussion meaningless?  
 
Sekolec 
 I would regard this criticism as unfounded. It is perhaps 
even dangerous from the viewpoint of public policy. If I am in a 
mediation and I make an admission or a proposal, of course I want 
this to be confidential. But if I have an invoice in my hand, before 
I even become aware of the mediation and I show it to the other 
party in an effort to convince him/her to pay, then I should not lose 
the opportunity to use this piece of evidence in subsequent court 
proceedings. If the law provided that I would lose this piece of 
evidence, I would be in a quandary. I would want to use the 
invoice in the mediation, but would scarcely be able to do so 
because if the mediation failed, I would need the invoice as 
evidence to prove my case in court. Perfectly admissible evidence 
that existed before the mediation took place, does not become 
inadmissible solely by virtue of the fact that it was used in 
mediation. Admissions, proposals, statements and views, the fact 
that one party indicated its willingness to accept the proposal – all 
these matters that actually arise during the mediation process are 
inadmissible. Everything else is potentially admissible.  
In addition, for reasons of public policy, the duty of 
confidentiality must be subject to further overriding exceptions. 
For example, if a mediation would reveal a threat to public health, 
an intent to harm the environment, a terrorist threat or similar, the 
duty of confidentiality must yield to other principles of law. 
There is of course the additional general duty of 
confidentiality in article 9. Certain information, which does not 
fall under 10, may be caught by article 9. For example, while 
certain information may be admissible in evidence in other 
proceedings, the conciliator and other participants are forbidden 
from passing on that information to other persons or the public.   
I think we drafted the articles on confidentiality very 
carefully and provided a balanced solution. Such an approach 
manages potential misuse of the mediation process. For example, 
it does not attach inadmissibility to something which should be 
admissible for reasons of public policy. At the same time it 
provides a commercially reasonable solution to safeguard the 
legitimate interests of parties. 
 
Alexander 
A related issue is the enforceability of agreements to 
mediate and the enforceability of settlements. Could you make 
some comments about that? 
 
Sekolec   
First let us discuss the enforceability of settlements. 
Everybody agrees that the settlement agreement is a contract and 
therefore enforceable as a contract. If parties participating in the 
provisions 
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mediation are properly advised, they will draft a settlement 
agreement that is legally binding as a contract and will be able to 
obtain a judgment to enforce it. So my first observation is that the 
problem is not as severe as it seems.  There is no compelling need 
to change the nature of an instrument which is, in essence, a 
contract. Why do we want to give the settlement agreement the 
force of a judgment?  
 
Alexander 
Or an award? 
 
Sekolec 
Indeed. Settlement agreements are the result of the parties 
taking control of the management of their own dispute with the 
help of a mediator. They often contain elements that are unique to 
the parties and not easily enforceable as judgments or awards. 
Settlement agreements may include revisions of existing contracts, 
promises to negotiate contractual obligations in the future, or best 
efforts clauses. There may also be clear cut obligations in 
settlement agreements: for example, to pay an amount of money.  
It is a potential source of problems to give a settlement 
agreement the force of a judgment or an award because it was not 
formulated by a judge or an arbitrator as the result of an 
adversarial process. By declaring the settlement agreement an 
award or a judgment, one may lose the opportunity of addressing 
potential issues of fraud and duress that may have occurred during 
the mediation process. Addressing those issues for the purposes of 
converting a settlement agreement into an award or judgment is 
complicated and, in the view of many, not worth the trouble. 
Therefore, if a settlement were to be regarded as a 
judgment or an award, there would also be a need for a system of 
setting aside a settlement obtained as a result of duress or mistake. 
A court judgment typically cannot be challenged on such grounds 
because the parties are not responsible for the terms of the 
judgment.  Such additions would introduce technical difficulties in 
the mediation system. 
But these are not the only reasons.  If one goes to court 
with a settlement agreement, the amount of proving one has to do 
is very limited.  It is limited to the existence of the settlement 
agreement.  One does not have to prove liability or fault stemming 
from the underlying conflict.  Everything is crystallized in the 
settlement agreement.  So the process of getting a judgment or an 
award is much more straightforward than going to court to prove a 
case.  
 
Alexander 
Where there is a settlement agreement and one party is 
trying to prove that misleading and deceptive conduct or even 
fraud occurred during the mediation, it will need to refer to events 
that occurred during the mediation and may want to subpoena the 
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mediator?  Doesn’t this sort of situation open up a Pandora’s box 
of conflicting domestic laws? 
 
Sekolec 
Yes, it would open up a Pandora’s box indeed. There have 
been a small percentage of cases in which duress, cheating or other 
illegal activity occurs in the negotiating phase. I doubt that any 
legislator would want to forgo the tools that exist in the various 
domestic legal systems to control and manage these rare instances 
in the context of mediation.  
Giving a settlement agreement the strength of an arbitral 
award, or a court judgment, in my opinion, means bowing to 
fashion.  Mediation is now a big deal and people are so eager to 
promote it that they feel it should be institutionalized in order to 
give it more legal effect. But in my view we should not go 
overboard. 
It is a different matter if one allows the parties to appoint 
an arbitrator with the specific purpose of incorporating the 
settlement agreement into an arbitral award or to approach a judge 
to confer expedited enforceability on the settlement in a 
standardized process.  This may work in a number of jurisdictions 
and may add a welcome new quality to the mediation.  The 
flexibility of the Model Law allows the parties to make a 
conscious decision to incorporate processes which involve 
transforming a settlement agreement into an award or court order. 
However, the parties will need to ensure they select a jurisdiction, 
the laws of which will facilitate their dispute processing needs. 
 
Alexander 
So to summarize this point, is it fair to say that there are 
following two views on the enforceability of settlements? First, 
giving settlement agreements the strength of a judgment or an 
award would encourage parties to mediate transnational disputes. 
In particular, there would be more certainty and finality about the 
enforceability of a mediated agreement. Second, the alternate view 
(and your view) is that a contract is a very different beast to an 
award or a judgment. One cannot always include in an award 
matters which one would include in a settlement agreement. Items 
such as apologies, acknowledgements of past behavior or acts, 
statements of intention of future behavior and agreements to 
negotiate in the future are not typically enforceable and therefore 
would not be suitable for the terms of an award or judgment in 
most jurisdictions. Moreover, institutionalizing settlement 
agreements by turning them into awards or judgments goes against 
the principles of voluntariness, party autonomy and responsibility 
in mediation. The idea that parties take responsibility for their 
dispute, agree on a way forward and remain responsible for the 
implementation of what they have agreed is abandoned the 
moment settlement agreements are institutionalized. At this point 
that parties are relying on the private international justice system 
conduct and 
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to guarantee an end to their dispute. 
 
Sekolec 
Yes that is a fair summary. However, having said that, it is 
perhaps useful to provide expedited enforceability to certain 
settlements. Here we come across different domestic procedural 
traditions and these traditions do not lend themselves to a uniform 
rule. I would encourage states which adopt the Model Law to use 
procedures for the enforceability of settlement agreements with 
which they are familiar and comfortable in their particular legal 
tradition.  For example, in a number of countries if a notary co-
signs a settlement agreement then it becomes enforceable in the 
same way as an award or a judgment.  In other countries a similar 
effect may be achieved if the parties’ attorneys co-sign the 
settlement.  These solutions, which are known, for example, 
Germany and Austria, work well in some systems, but may not 
work as well in others.   
 
Alexander  
Would the German model have been an option that might 
have worked well in the Model Law?   
 
Sekolec 
We did not include it in the Model Law not because we did 
not believe in this form of notarized settlement, but because we 
wanted countries to consider the law from their own perspective 
and include it if they so chose.  For example, considering the 
function of US notaries, I doubt that the USA legislator would be 
ready to permit notarized settlements in the United States of 
America to have such far reaching legal consequences.  
The Model Law only offers limited harmonized rules upon 
which the UNCITRAL Working Group could agree on a global 
level.  The enforceability issue is left to each country to deal with 
in the context of the enacting State. 
If the parties really want enforceability, they can appoint an 
arbitrator; they can even appoint a mediator as an arbitrator if it is 
done with the agreement of both parties. There is, of course, a 
prohibition in the Model Law on mediators also acting as 
arbitrators. However, as it is a default provision, both parties can 
agree to override it.   
 
Alexander 
This last point of yours takes us back to one of the pillars 
of the Model Law: party autonomy. 
 
Sekolec 
Exactly. Consider the possibility that the parties, after they 
have reached a settlement agreement, appoint the mediator to be 
an arbitrator for five minutes. During those five minutes the 
mediator/arbitrator could issue an arbitral award on the agreed 
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terms, which is recognized by article 31 of the UNCITRAL Model 
Law on Arbitration.   
When we discussed this possibility in the inter-
governmental Working Group, some people said that it would 
work well on the basis of the experience in their countries. Others 
from legal systems such as the United States indicated that while it 
was an attractive idea, technically it would not work because in 
order to have an arbitration one needs to have a dispute. By 
definition once a settlement has been reached, there is no longer a 
dispute. So from their perspective, it would not work. I would 
venture to suggest that common law legal systems are particularly 
susceptible to this argumentation. While some may dispute the 
validity of this argument, it was considered important enough to 
exclude this form of med/arb from the Model Law.  
 
Alexander 
Why would the idea of the mediator being appointed as an 
arbitrator to transform the settlement agreement into an award be 
less of a problem in civil law jurisdictions? 
 
Sekolec 
In civil law jurisdictions, the notion of dispute as a 
condition precedent to arbitration is broader than in common law 
jurisdictions. Where debtors agree that they are liable but maintain 
that they do not have the money to pay, then there is no dispute in 
common law jurisdictions.  However, in civil law jurisdictions 
there may still be a dispute. But this does not apply to all civil law 
countries. So one may need more than a clearly drafted settlement 
clause in order to convert it into an arbitral award or make it 
otherwise directly enforceable. 
 
 
Alexander 
So from what you are saying, the process for enforceability 
of mediated settlements needs to be developed with practice. I 
imagine it would be very important at the preliminary meetings of 
a mediation to look at the level of enforceability desired by the 
parties and to be very clear about this.  
 
Sekolec 
Yes. This leads to the related issues about the applicable 
law, negotiating the process of enforceability upfront and 
committing it all to writing. 
 
Alexander 
Some people would say that this sort of system would 
encourage forum shopping. Where one party decides it no longer 
wishes to abide by the terms of a settlement agreement, that party 
may forum shop to find the domestic law least likely to enforce the 
settlement. What are your thoughts on this point? 
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Sekolec 
In a voluntary process in which each party can pull the 
plug at any moment, there is no harm in forum shopping. People 
can choose the mediator, the place and the applicable law. If they 
cannot agree on these views then the mediation will terminate 
anyway. In most cases theses issues will be sorted out before a 
settlement is reached. 
 
Alexander 
Article 5 deals with the appointment of conciliators. Under 
the provision it is quite possible that the parties may not be able to 
agree on the conciliator(s). There is no fallback or default 
provision if the parties cannot agree. If this provision was a 
contractual clause in Australia, there is a good chance that a court 
would hold it to be unenforceable due to lack of certainty of terms. 
What was UNCITRAL’s reasoning for providing such an open-
ended appointment process?  
 
Sekolec 
The idea was that the parties should be able to successfully 
negotiate the appointment of conciliators themselves if they are 
serious about participating in the conciliation. There is therefore 
no compelling need for a complete fall-back procedure.  
Of course often the parties will agree to refer to standard 
rules of an institution or procedural traditions in order to appoint a 
mediator. In court-annexed mediation the court may appoint a 
mediator. The Model Law will yield to these specific situations 
because of the default nature of article 5. Again, UNCITRAL’s 
texts aim to be workable in all countries of the world, so a non-
intrusive default provision is more likely to be acceptable across 
the board.  
 
Alexander  
We have spoken about the enforceability of settlements.  
What about the enforceability of agreements to conciliate? What 
happens when one party initiates conciliation on the basis of an 
agreement to conciliate in a commercial contract and the other 
party argues that this clause is not enforceable? 
 
Sekolec 
Well, in that case it will depend on how the clause was 
drafted.  There may be contractual liability, liability for costs if a 
party does not live up to what it has agreed. If the case was 
referred to mediation by a court, whether or not there was an 
agreement to mediate, then there may be further consequences –
even contempt of court depending on what the local law provides. 
The Working Group elected not to legislate on such matters 
because it would interfere to an unnecessary extent with well-
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established principles of domestic contract law and procedural 
law. 
It is left to the national laws to determine whether an 
agreement to conciliate is enforceable and to determine the 
consequences of the violation of such agreements. Whether an 
agreement to conciliate is enforceable pursuant to the national law 
depends on the origin of the mediation process – whether it be an 
existing clause in a commercial contract or an ad hoc agreement 
by the parties. The enforceability of such an agreement also 
depends on the drafting of the clause. If, for example, one has an 
elaborate clause saying that the parties commit themselves not to 
commence arbitration proceedings until they have had five 
meetings with mediators and explored all options, it would be 
reasonable to have some contractual consequences for violating 
this clause. On the other hand, one could have a more generally 
worded clause saying that the parties will try to settle their dispute 
amicably, and, if not, go to arbitration. What does this clause 
mean? Must the parties engage (and pay) a third neutral mediator 
before they can go to arbitration? The answer depends on the 
interpretation of the clause. One cannot determine whether an 
agreement to conciliate is enforceable, without considering the law 
of the applicable jurisdiction. Professor Alexander, you mentioned 
that under your law certain conciliation agreements are not 
enforceable because their terms are not sufficiently clear and 
certain.  Hence the enforceability of a duty to mediate or conciliate 
is left to a contractual agreement and the applicable contract law of 
national jurisdictions.  It may be that at some time in the future 
harmonized rules on the enforceability of agreements to mediate 
will be prepared, but at this stage I think the international 
community is not ready for it. Such an agreement would then be 
enforced either by a court under international private law or an 
international arbitral tribunal, where conciliation was specified as 
a precondition to arbitration.  
 
Alexander 
Article 13 deals with the possibility of staying arbitral 
and judicial proceedings as a way to enforce agreements to 
conciliate, in which the commitment to refrain from arbitrating or 
litigating until certain pre-conditions are met is clearly set out. The 
proviso ‘except to the extent necessary for a party, in its opinion, 
to preserve its rights’ has been criticized for being so wide as to 
strip the provision of its effectiveness. What are your views on 
this? 
 
Sekolec 
 
It is true that the provision opens a wide door to instituting arbitral 
or court proceedings.  At the same time, it gives comfort to parties. 
They will be more likely to agree to mediate because they will not 
be subject to restrictions regarding their process options.  
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Alexander 
You have spoken about the voluntary nature of mediation 
and the fact that the parties may pull the plug or withdraw from the 
mediation at any time. In fact, under the terms of the MLC the 
parties are not compelled to attend a first mediation session. Many 
institutionalized rules of courts or chambers of commerce such as 
the ICC require disputing parties to attend the first meeting. 
Beyond this point, the parties are free to withdraw at any time. The 
theory is that in the context of a global disputing culture in rapid 
change, such mandatory attendance rules establish a minimum 
certainty of participation and, importantly, may enable parties 
from cultures where negotiating is a sign of weakness to save face. 
Where parties have engaged a skilled conciliator, they may see an 
opportunity in the first meeting to settle. If they don’t, they have 
lost nothing. Why did UNCITRAL not go down this path? 
 
Sekolec 
 There were indeed suggestions that UNCITRAL should 
draft a rule stipulating that the parties must have at least one 
meeting.  There were several reasons why we did not go down this 
path. One reason was that, unlike the ICC, which is operating with 
a specific ADR clause and a set of rules providing a certain 
predictability of procedure, UNCITRAL is dealing with the 
broadest spectrum of international situations including ‘dinner 
party mediations’. 
 
Alexander 
What is a ‘dinner party mediation’? 
 
Sekolec 
When two people have a dispute and they call a third 
person that they trust and say ‘Let’s go for a beer. Can you help us 
solve our dispute?’ No one may have uttered the word mediation. 
These people do what comes naturally and makes common sense. 
They ask a business ‘elder’ to help them solve their problem. Now, 
according to the Model Law, this is a mediation. These parties and 
the mediator may therefore be covered by the Model Law. What 
does it mean ‘to meet’? Would this count as a first meeting or 
would it be classified as a preliminary pre-mediation meeting?  
Let’s use electronic commerce as another example. What 
does it mean ‘to meet’? If you are in Australia and I am in Austria, 
we can meet in cyberspace; we could exchange emails. But where 
are we technically meeting and are we meeting at all in the first 
place?  
Take a very simple dispute resolution clause: ‘The parties 
will try to settle the dispute amicably, and if they do not settle, 
they will refer the matter to arbitration.’  Must the parties on the 
basis of this clause fly from Australia to London to have one 
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meeting with the mediator? No. It would be going too far to 
demand this in all cases. This is why we left any obligation to 
meet to the agreed procedural rules. It is true that requiring the 
parties to meet can be very useful in many cases. However, if one 
applies it to cover the whole spectrum of mediation situations, it is 
too rigid. UNCITRAL wants to encourage as many countries as 
possible to enact the Model Law and not to discourage them by 
being overly prescriptive about procedural elements of mediation. 
 
Alexander 
Why is the article on suspension of limitation periods 
optional rather than one which operates by default? 
 
Sekolec 
There were strong arguments in favor of making it a 
default article. But again, let’s put ourselves in the situation where 
two disputing parties on either side of a European border enlist the 
assistance of the third person to help them solve their dispute. 
They do not use the word mediation or conciliation. They just ask 
the third person over to dinner or for a drink at a bar – a ‘dinner 
party mediation’. Would this conversation officially signify the 
commencement of conciliation proceedings? Would the limitation 
period regarding a legal claim be suspended at this point? Here we 
are in a grey area: what is the point at which a conversation behind 
a bar becomes a mediation? Are you mediating or are you just 
engaging in a normal conversation?  Technical legal consequences 
flowing from the commencement of conciliation proceedings 
function well if linked to structured mediation rules of an 
institution or a court-directed process. However, if one is involved 
in a spontaneous mediation, the parties may be totally unaware 
that they are interrupting something called a limitation period. I 
think one of the principles governing the interruption of limitation 
periods is that the party with the claim must be reasonably capable 
of knowing that it has lost the benefit of the limitation period.  
Perhaps the more forceful argument is that in many 
countries the parties are free to agree on how they will manage the 
limitation periods linked to related legal claims. For example, the 
parties may agree to extend the limitation period.  In those 
countries where parties are not free to do so, I would say that the 
legislator should empower them to manage the limitation period 
themselves so that when they start a mediation they can agree on 
the suspension of the running of the limitation period. I see no 
rational reason why commercial parties should not be able to enter 
into agreements relating to limitation periods.  I regard limitations 
to this freedom as outdated.   
 
Alexander 
You point out that one of the reasons for making the 
suspension of limitation period provision optional rather than 
default was that as a default provision, parties may not be aware of 
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the implications of beginning a mediation process. Can’t you 
apply the same reasoning to the confidentiality provisions? Parties 
might begin a dinner party mediation and not be aware of the 
confidentiality provisions of the Model Law that apply as a default 
measure.  
 
Sekolec 
Yes, but then one would also have to interpret that 
particular situation to determine the extent to which the parties 
have waived the obligation of confidentiality by talking about the 
mediation in front of other people. This involves interpreting the 
will of the parties. It may well be that if one party speaks to a 
friend about the mediation, it will not have not violated any 
statutory duty. 
 
Alexander 
Did the UNCITRAL Working Group draw inspiration from 
the Model Law on Arbitration? 
 
Sekolec  
The Model Law on Arbitration deals with a different 
animal. Arbitration involves an adversarial process to which the 
parties have committed themselves. In arbitration, there is a 
binding decision at the end, whether the parties like it or not. I do 
not think we drew any direct inspiration from the Model 
Arbitration Law when drafting the substance of the MLC.  More 
generally, however, the context in which we drafted the 
Arbitration Model Law was not dissimilar to the context in which 
we drafted the MLC. In both cases we worked against the 
backdrop of widely-used influential sets of contractual rules such 
as the UNCITRAL arbitration rules from 1976 and the 
UNICTRAL conciliation rules from 1980.  We also studied the 
contractual rules of many mediation and conciliation institutions 
as we had studied the procedural and contractual provisions of 
arbitration institutions previously. The model rules from these 
institutions have rendered tremendous service to the world of 
arbitration and now to the world of mediation.  However we came 
to realize first with arbitration and then with conciliation that, in 
addition to a contractual regime, a statute was needed.  If the 
general law thwarts the parties’ contractual agreement, they will 
experience tensions and uncertainty.  That is why we prepared the 
highly successful Model Law on Arbitration and later we decided 
it would be good to prepare a Model Law on Conciliation.  We 
prepared the MLC with a view to dealing with those few points 
which are necessary to be addressed by statute.  
 
Alexander 
So in other words, the philosophy was to keep it simple 
and focus on the main features or the pillars that require legislative 
action, leaving the rest to the national states.  
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Sekolec 
When we drafted the MLC, we not only had to take into 
account the governments and industries but also the mediation and 
arbitration community in order to arrive at a text that was practice-
friendly.  
If you consult the documentation of the sessions of the 
UNCITRAL Working Group on Conciliation in which we discuss 
the provision of the Model Law, you will see the active role of 
non-governmental organizations. Over the years 90 states have 
participated in the sessions and 20 non-governmental 
organizations. 
 
Alexander  
Could you comment on the relationship between the Model 
Law (2002) and the Conciliation Rules (1980)?  
 
Sekolec  
We are flexible in terms of the procedural rules that parties 
choose to use. Where current rules of mediation institutions 
function well, UNCITRAL does not wish to interfere with them.   
Over the past 23 years the UNICTRAL conciliation rules have 
actually radiated a lot of influence. When I look at the mediation 
rules used in Argentina, Australia or Germany, for example, I 
notice formulations based on the UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules. 
For example, the general Magna Carta of the UNCITRAL 
Conciliation rules is that the conciliator will respect the will of the 
parties and will conduct the process as he or she considers 
appropriate.  One sees these principles reflected in many sets of 
rules. 
 
Alexander  
Mr Sekolec, you and Judge Getty of the USA have written 
an article about the UNCITRAL Model Law on Conciliation and 
the Model Uniform Mediation Act of the United States (UMA). 
Could you make some comments about the relationship between 
these two pieces of model legislation?   
 
Sekolec  
The draft Uniform Mediation Act was being discussed at 
the National Conference of Commissioners for Uniform State 
Laws, while we were getting together the ideas for the Model Law.  
It was always interesting to read reports of the NCCUSL.  Let me 
give you an example of how we were inspired by those 
discussions.  America, like many other countries, decided to do 
something about enforceability.  Many said: ‘Let’s declare that a 
settlement agreement is as enforceable as a judgment because this 
would promote the use of mediation’.  However, there were some 
interesting comments from the drafters of the UMA who gave an 
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example of a case in Texas. In this case a woman maintained that 
she was cheated and coerced in the mediation process. She 
claimed the other side had acted fraudulently.  The drafters 
considered what to do in the case of fraud. If they were to declare 
a settlement agreement enforceable as a judgment, then they would 
need to provide a safety net for fraudulent cases.  At UNCITRAL 
we were able to learn from the deliberations of the NCCUSL, 
which in turn escalated the pace of our own deliberations.  
 
Alexander 
So both the UNCITRAL Working Group on Conciliation 
and the NCCUSL considered similar issues, but these bodies 
reached different conclusions on how to regulate certain aspects of 
mediation? 
 
Sekolec  
Yes. Although the issues we were facing were quite 
similar, the NCCUSL were dealing with mediation in a national 
context. For example, the right to be represented by an attorney is 
so sacred in US practice that an attorney or another individual 
designated to represent a party may accompany the party in a 
mediation. In circumstances in which a waiver of legal 
participation has been given before the mediation, such a waiver 
may be rescinded by the party wanting representation.  
Furthermore, the definition of mediation in the UMA is narrower 
than the UNCITRAL definition, but equally legitimate. For 
instance, the US Uniform Mediation Act only covers mediations 
by mediators who hold themselves out as providing mediation. At 
UNCITRAL we were also looking at the interests and experience 
of other countries in mediation, for example Kenya, India, 
Argentina, Peru and Australia.  We were gathering materials from 
these countries and were also inspired by them.  As you know, in 
August 2003 the NCCUSL included a new provision in the UMA, 
subjecting international cases to the UNCITRAL Model Law.   
 
Alexander 
So in other words the UMA applies only to domestic cases 
in the USA? 
 
Sekolec 
Yes.  If there is an international case, then according to the 
provisions of the Uniform Mediation Act, the case is governed by 
a slightly modified version of the UNCITRAL Model Law. 
Therefore there is a direct incorporation of the UNCITRAL Model 
Law into the Uniform Mediation Act. 
 
Alexander  
Have you received feedback from any countries regarding 
their interest in enacting the Model Law? 
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Sekolec 
Croatia has enacted a mediation law which looks very 
much like the UNCITRAL Model Law.  In fact, it is the Model 
Law.  Hungary also has adopted a law that follows the 
UNCITRAL Model Law but as that text is still in Hungarian I 
have not been able to read it.  These are just examples. As 
countries do not always inform us of changes in their laws, even if 
they do it on the basis of an UNCITRAL model text, we are not 
able to follow these systematically. Judging by the interest 
expressed in the Model Law at the 6th Committee of the United 
Nations General Assembly, as well as elsewhere, many countries 
are looking at mediation as a promising form of dispute resolution. 
Countries are also realizing that it is necessary to have minimum 
statutory regulation as a foundation to support the development of 
international mediation practice. 
 
Alexander  
We have been speaking about the American UMA. 
Australia has taken a different approach. I would be interested to 
hear your views on it.  There is an interdisciplinary body in 
Australia, called NADRAC (National Alternative Dispute 
Resolution Advisory Council) which was set up in 1995 to advise 
the government on issues relating to ADR. In the year 2000 
NADRAC released a report on ADR standards. The report 
recommended a framework approach rather than uniform 
mediation standards.   
A framework approach provides a model for balancing the 
desire for diversity and flexibility in practice on one hand, and the 
need for quality assurance and consistency in practice quality on 
the other. It involves organizations and industries committing to 
address specific criteria relating to training and service delivery 
standards. However, the precise manner in which industries and 
organizations deal with these issues is left to them. 
 
Sekolec  
What you are describing is very interesting and is 
compatible with UNCITRAL’s approach. As a body proposing 
model legislation, UNCITRAL has taken the path of minimum 
regulation of the foundations of mediation (primarily 
confidentiality) and has encouraged mediation institutions 
throughout the world to provide rules of procedure suitable to their 
contexts, taking into account cultural, political, legal and industry 
factors.  
In my view an assurance of the fundamental features of 
mediation can only credibly be given by the law and not by the 
agreement of the parties. I think it is a sign of good progress to 
provide minimum standards.  
Beyond the minimum standards, there will be diversity. 
For example, how does one deal with the issue of the duties of the 
mediator when s/he caucuses with a party? Must s/he keep that 
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information confidential upfront unless the party provides the 
mediator with special dispensation? Or is it the other way around, 
so that the mediator can inform the other party of everything 
unless the first party specifically requests the mediator not to do so 
on these issues? Life is beautiful because of these differences and 
the consequences and merits of each approach will unfold as 
mediation practice increases. Perhaps one approach will emerge as 
the better, or maybe both will co-exist. It may depend on the 
atmosphere and the dynamics of the particular case. We will wait 
and see.  
 
Alexander  
I would like to discuss the roles that good faith and natural 
justice play in the Model Law and in international ADR generally.  
 
Sekolec 
This is an important question. Good faith, natural justice, 
fairness, equity and all related concepts have a different meaning if 
one moves from legal system to legal system. In arbitration very 
rigorous adherence to due process of law (natural justice) is 
required.  Without due process, the award will be vitiated. 
However, mediation is a voluntary process and either party can 
terminate the process at any moment. Therefore one does not need 
a rigorous adherence to due process. In arbitration one is dealing 
with past issues and liabilities, whereas mediation goes beyond 
this and deals with how to set aside a dispute and restructure the 
relationship for the future. In mediation one is dealing with the (re-
) creation of a contractual relationship, not a statutory-based 
award. There is no judge or arbitrator who evaluates whether a 
mediated settlement agreement meets the criteria of good faith. 
What is fair is ultimately up to the parties.  I think it would be a 
disservice to mediation if UNCITRAL would include in the Rules, 
or worse in the Law, that a mediated settlement must meet some 
criteria of equity, fairness or justice.  
It is the process that must be fair - the procedure rather 
than the settlement. For example, parties must be able to negotiate 
without suffering duress from the other side; they must feel 
confident that the process is kept confidential, that the other side is 
not engaging in misleading, deceptive or fraudulent conduct. One 
party must not take advantage of the other. The process must be 
rigorous and fair but the outcome is like any other contract. It is a 
business relationship and it is for the parties to decide what is good 
for them. In mediation the law protects the parties from the same 
risks as in the normal run of contractual negotiations.  
We should not invent special concepts of fairness and 
natural justice for mediation because mediation is nothing more 
than a more than a sophisticated, third-party assisted contractual 
negotiation. We already have the appropriate mechanisms and 
concepts in contract law. 
Article 6(3) MLC uses the words ‘fair treatment’. It has 
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been drafted very carefully to indicate that the test of fair treatment 
applies to the conduct of the parties during the proceedings and not 
to the outcome or to the substance of the agreement. So the issues 
of good faith and equity play out differently in mediation 
compared with arbitration. 
 
Alexander 
So when you say that we have the mechanisms already in 
place, you are referring to the enacting states.  
 
Sekolec 
Each enacting state has contract law that already deals with 
how far a judge should go in ensuring fairness and natural justice 
in pre-contractual dealings. 
 
Alexander 
I can imagine there might be some criticism of the word 
fairness. Fairness is a wonderfully all-encompassing term. 
However the law of contract and statute law in many jurisdictions 
would not be able to enforce a contractual clause requiring 
fairness.   
 
Sekolec 
That is true and that is also the beauty of the Model Law. If 
a concept does not fit a particular national system, the enacting 
state can change it.  
The word fairness has an interesting linguistic meaning. 
When fairness is translated into Latin-based languages such as 
French and Spanish it becomes equité and equidad.  These terms 
are related to the concept of equity.  The common law countries 
were nervous when they saw the word equity, because it also has a 
technical meaning and because the meaning could spill over into 
the equity of the settlement. We did not want to subject a 
settlement agreement to the test of equity. Nobody should look 
over the shoulders of the parties and determine whether the 
settlement agreement is equitable or not. The Guide to Enactment 
clarifies that the term Fairness refers to the procedural aspects of 
the conciliation and not to the outcome.  
 
Alexander 
The concept of good faith in contractual relationships has 
had a very different history in common law jurisdictions compared 
with civil law jurisdictions. Could you comment on this in light of 
the Model Law?  
 
Sekolec 
While there were historical differences, it is nowadays too 
simplistic to refer to how the common law deals with these issues 
versus how the civil law does. Common law countries consist of 
over 40 different jurisdictions. Interventionist judges exist in both 
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systems. So-called civil law judges are becoming more and more 
reluctant to intervene in a legitimate contractual relationship on the 
basis of the lack of good faith. And in common law jurisdictions 
recent developments in case law and in legislation have, in certain 
circumstances, required parties to act in good faith in pre-
contractual dealings especially in consumer legislation.  
 
Alexander 
So, in your experience, the two systems are effectively 
moving towards each other? 
 
Sekolec 
Yes. So it is becoming increasingly difficult to make 
generalizations about legal systems and traditions as we did in the 
past. 
 
Alexander 
The provisions in the Model Law have the nature of being 
default provisions so the parties can contract out of them. Are 
there any exceptions to this?  
 
Sekolec 
There are two exceptions: articles 2 and 6(3). Article 2 is 
the interpretation provision. I do not think that it is technically 
necessary to make this provision mandatory but there is no harm. 
Article 2 (1) provides that: ‘In the interpretation of this Law, 
regard is to be had to its international origin and to the need to 
promote uniformity in its application and the observance of good 
faith.’ 
The article is a reminder to the judge and it is a guideline 
for interpretation, which favors harmony in an international 
context. Article 2(2) provides that where the answer to an issue 
governed by the Model Law is not expressly settled in the Law, 
one should look to the general principles on which the Model Law 
is based. So when there is a technical point that falls within the 
ambit of the provisions of the Model Law, one should first look for 
an answer in the philosophy of the Model Law rather than the 
(national) law outside the Model Law. Article 2 encourages 
national courts to look to the international character and origin of 
the Model law, which may include how other countries have 
understood and interpreted their enactment of the Model Law.  
 
Alexander 
Just on that point, won’t countries be tempted first to look 
to what their national law says either in the field of mediation or 
conciliation or in a parallel field such as arbitration? 
 
Sekolec 
If the issue is not governed by the Model Law then judges 
will look at their national laws to solve the problem and would be 
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justified in doing so. If, however, an issue is governed by the 
Model Law (but not expressly settled by it), then the user of the 
law must look to the Model Law for interpretation.  This is the 
same principle that has been adopted in other pieces of legislation 
such as the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods. 
 
Alexander 
Was that principle adopted in the Model Law on 
Arbitration also? 
 
Sekolec 
We did not use it in the Model Law on Arbitration because 
at that time in 1985 the feeling was that a Model Law which 
becomes a national statute (and not an international treaty) should 
not be telling a national judge what to do. We were focused on the 
quality of the provisions rather than the issue of uniformity. This 
time we gave more emphasis to the fact that the Model Law is an 
instrument of harmonization of national laws and that it should be 
interpreted uniformly (that is, taking into account the international 
character and origin of the law and the need to promote uniformity 
in its application). The message to all national courts of enacting 
states dealing with an issue governed by the MLC is to think 
globally and look at the philosophy underlying this law.  
 
Alexander 
You mentioned article 6 as the other mandatory provision? 
 
Sekolec 
The other mandatory provision is article 6 (3): ‘In any case, 
in conducting the proceedings, the conciliator shall seek to 
maintain fair treatment of the parties and, in so doing, shall take 
into account the circumstances of the case.’  
It is the ‘shall seek fair treatment of the parties’ part of the 
article which is important. I think public policy is the big hand 
watching over the well-being of the parties.  The obligation of 
procedural fair treatment is something that should always be there 
for the parties. If it is not, then the form of dispute resolution 
looses the character of mediation or conciliation, and becomes 
something else. 
Hopefully this fair treatment will not be translated into 
something, which will require the substance of mediated 
agreements to meet equitable criteria.  
 
Alexander 
Why did you choose fair treatment to be a mandatory 
provision but not confidentiality?  
 
Sekolec 
Confidentiality is for the benefit of the parties and they can 
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always dispense with it. There may be some situations in which 
parties do not require all or part of the mediation to be 
confidential. Indeed, the parties may agree to go public with some 
or all aspects of their dispute and the legislator should have no 
reason to prevent them from doing so.  Also, as we discussed 
earlier, there may be certain cultures and dispute resolution 
traditions where confidentiality does not play such a significant 
role as in western mediation.  
 
Alexander 
The Model Law is envisaged for business to business 
(B2B) disputes in an international context. It can of course also be 
used by enacting states as a model for commercial domestic 
disputes. What about business to consumer (B2C) disputes, 
particularly in the context of electronic commerce such as eBay? 
Often consumers commit themselves to mediation in the event of a 
dispute through a consumer contract. Bearing in mind the power 
imbalance that exists between an individual consumer and a large 
corporation, might there not be scope for an argument that more of 
the MLC should be mandatory, rather than default – for example 
the confidentiality provisions?  
 
Sekolec 
My reply would simply be that the Model Law is indeed 
meant for commercial (B2B) cases only. Although what is 
commercial is subject to a somewhat flexible definition referred to 
in a footnote of the MLC. It provides that: ‘the term ‘commercial’ 
should be given a wide interpretation so as to cover matters arising 
from all relationships of a commercial nature, whether contractual 
or not’, and it gives examples of relationships of a commercial 
nature. Therefore an eBay relationship may in some cases be 
regarded as commercial and not in others. It is a question of 
interpretation. 
We were confident that this text was suitable for 
commercial cases; however, we also thought that most of the text, 
if not all of it, would be suitable for non-commercial cases such as 
consumer cases. With respect to non-commercial cases there may 
be scope to amend parts of the Model Law and the nature of the 
provisions in order to protect the weaker party. Again, 
UNCITRAL has restricted the application of the Model Law to 
B2B disputes only and left any extension of the law to B2C 
disputes and other non-commercial cases to the enacting states. 
Why? Because the approaches of the legislators in countries like 
Australia, some European countries and the United States 
concerning consumer protection are different from the approach of 
developing countries. And there are differences among developed 
countries as well. 
An interesting possibility is for states to provide that the 
Model Law applies to B2B and B2C disputes, subject to consumer 
protection legislation. With the rapid increase in trans border e-
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commerce, this is an issue that national jurisdictions will have to 
consider carefully. 
 
Alexander 
Earlier you explained the minimum legislative approach of 
UNCITRAL, which aims to encourage flexibility and diversity in 
national and international mediation practice. You also spoke of 
the need for quality assurance in mediation practice. Which bodies 
do you think should be establishing quality assurance systems such 
as benchmarks, trust mark systems, standards for conduct in 
mediation, ethical codes, and so on. It seems that to leave this only 
to nation states would encourage a proliferation of different quality 
assurance systems and methods. This, in turn, could lead to an 
unnecessarily complex conflict of laws issues, for example, with 
respect to mediator liability issues. So, who do you think should be 
regulating these matters?  
 
Sekolec 
I agree with you that a national institution – public or 
private – is not the ideal body to establish quality assurance 
schemes for international disputes. At the same time, it would be 
much too bold, too precipitous, for UNCITRAL as an 
intergovernmental body to start setting up frameworks for 
standards of mediation practice. 
My reaction is that cross-border private institutions such as 
the International Chamber of Commerce would be appropriate to 
manage quality issues. The advantage of such organizations is that 
they operate on an international or regional basis already and in 
many cases provide the procedural rules within which 
international mediations occur. Further, regulations of private 
institutions can be amended more easily than the regulations 
created by governments. When governments start regulating, the 
rules become difficult to change and in some circumstances can 
become an impediment to trade.  
 
 Alexander 
After the publication of the Model Law, what steps is 
UNCITRAL proposing to encourage uniformity of application of 
the Model Law? 
 
Sekolec 
The way we work on promoting unification is though our 
CLOUT system which stands for ‘Case Law and UNCITRAL 
texts’. After the Model Law on Arbitration was published, we 
gathered court decisions and arbitral decisions about the Model 
Arbitration Law.  We published the results and were able to show 
the world in the six languages of the United Nations how judges 
and other interpreters of different jurisdictions have applied the 
law. This system has worked very successfully with the Model 
Law on Arbitration. We have published a large number of cases 
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and are now considering the preparation of a digest of case law.  
The CLOUT system reaches many people – lawyers, arbitrators, 
ADR providers, policy makers and law makers. It influences the 
future development of international arbitration and I have every 
reason to believe it will extend similar guidance to the 
development of international commercial conciliation. 
The UNCITRAL approach is a step-by-step approach to 
the development of a harmonized system of international dispute 
resolution. We start with a minimal interference approach and then 
work with nation states, NGOs and international service-providers 
to further improve the rules and to increase harmonization, whilst 
still maintaining flexibility in the future.  
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Legal instruments referred to in this interview are listed below. 
1. UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 1976; 
2. UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules 1980; 
3. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods 1980;  
4. UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial 
Arbitration 1985; 
5. UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial 
Conciliation 2002. 
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